Posted by
MarkJ on Thursday, September 27, 2007 10:10:42 PM
Much has been made of Iran's uranium enrichment program. One side claims that Iran is attempting to produce an atomic bomb, and the other side says Iran's word should be taken that the enrichment program is for the purely peaceful reason of making reactor fuel for a nuclear power program. In this, my first blog entry, I will attempt to explain why we should distrust the Iranians, and worry that they are indeed attempting to make an atomic bomb.
First, I believe it is likely that most Americans do not really understand what "enrichment" means, nor do they understand how it is accomplished or how much enrichment is needed to make weapons grade uranium. I'll answer the last question first--uranium must be enriched until the U-235 content is about 93 percent by weight of the total mass of uranium. Did that help? Probably not.
Uranium atoms, as they occur in nature, consist primarily of U-238 and U-235. This simply means that a U-238 atom consists of 92 protons and 146 neutrons. The U-235 atom consists of 92 protons and 143 neutrons. However, U-238 is much more prevalent in nature--more than 99% by weight of all uranium is U-238. Only about 0.75 percent by weight (wt%) is U-235.
This by itself is meaningless unless you know that, by a peculiarity of nature, U-235 atoms, if struck by free neutrons, can fission (split), and release more neutrons. Under the right circumstances, this can lead to a self-sustaining "chain reaction" where each fission causes at least one more fission. Although U-238 can also absorb neutrons and fission (though much less likely than U-235), it cannot sustain a chain reaction. If it does absorb a neutron, it is more likely to be transmuted to element 93, neptunium, which itself quickly transmutes to plutonium, but that's another story for another time.
The problem is that the probability of a U-235 atom absorbing a neutron and fissioning is much greater with "slow" neutrons than the "fast" neutrons that arise from the fission process or are sometimes spontaneously emitted from heavy atomic nuclei. By point of reference, fast neutrons are indeed fast as they are traveling at nearly the speed of light. "Slow" neutrons are only slow in a relative sense because they are still traveling at several thousand miles per hour. In order to sustain a chain reaction with natural uranium, the neutrons must be "moderated" to the slow speed by a suitable substance. The neutrons collide with lighter atomic nuclei and transfer most of their energy to the moderator atoms, eventually slowing down to the point where absorption in a U-235 atom becomes very likely. The uranium has to be very carefully arranged to enhance the probability of absorption (and fission) and the resulting nuclear reactor is generally very very large. Not any moderator will do either--you need either very pure graphite (carbon) or heavy water in order to sustain a chain reaction with natural uranium.
In order to make a smaller reactor (using, for example, ordinary water as the moderator, which also makes for a nice coolant), or to make a bomb, the percentage of U-235 must be increased to the point where the likelihood of fission is increased just because there are more U-235 atoms present. Typical commercial reactor fuel is 2 to 3 wt% enriched. So how is this done? Because the U-238 atom is slightly bigger than the U-235 atom, a gaseous form of uranium can be passed through many successive barriers which essentially filter out the larger particles. At the end of the stream you end up with more U-235 atoms in proportion to U-238 than you started out with--enriched uranium. This is the gaseous diffusion method, and requires HUGE plants and lots of electricity. Another, more modern, method, is to centrifuge the uranium gas. The heavier U-238 atoms are thus separated from the lighter U-235 atoms and you end up, again, with enriched uranium. This requires HUGE plants and lots of electricity.
Now, this is why we need to worry that Iran is not simply enriching uranium to about 2 to 3 wt% for reactor fuel, and instead is working towards that 93 wt% weapons grade level. Quite simply, it's because the technology is very complex and as mentioned the enrichment plants are very large and expensive to build and operate. After the uranium is enriched, it is not in a form suitable for reactor fuel. It generally is in the form of UF6 (uranium hexafluoride), and must be converted to U03, uranium oxide. Thus yet another large, expensive manufacturing facility is needed to do the conversion, and then to press the oxide into pellets, clad the pellets to contain the uranium, assemble the pellets into fuel pins, and assemble the fuel pins into reactor fuel assemblies. Yes, Iran could be doing this...but why, when they could simply buy the fuel from any number of commercial fuel manufacturers, who sell their product all around the world? Not only would Iran avoid the expense of the enrichment facility (figure a cost of about 1.5 billion dollars, which is what a centrifuge plant being built in the US is projected to cost, according to the September 2007 issue of Nuclear News) but they would also avoid all the pratfalls involved in engineering a system from scratch without benefit of prior experience (either theirs or, say, ours, since we are most definitely NOT exporting this technology to countries such as Iran!).
So this boils down to a simple question--why would Iran spend all that money and go through all those growing pain headaches to produce fuel for a power reactor when they could buy the stuff much cheaper from a commercial fuel manufacturer, and on a much quicker time frame? If I had to bet money on it, I'd bet they are not so interested in 3 wt% uranium but are very interested in 93 wt% uranium.